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Abstract
This article provides a simple framework to analyze the determinants of targeting
performance of utility tariffs and applies it to data on electricity in Cape Verde, Rwanda, and
Sao Tome and Principe. While most indicators of benefit incidence are silent as of why
subsidies are targeted the way they are (they only give an idea as to whether they reach the
poor or not and to what extent), we develop a simple decomposition that allows analyzing
both “access” and “subsidy-design” factors that influence the targeting performance of
subsidies. Our findings suggest that consumption subsidies for electricity in Cape Verde,
Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe are regressive in large part due to access factors that
prevent the poor from using the services. We then conduct simulations to quantify how much
targeting performance could be enhanced by changing tariff-structures as well as subsidizing
connections instead of consumption.
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1. Introduction 
 
Given the budget constraints faced by many governments a good targeting performance 
of public subsidies (whether in cash or in kind) is important for the reduction of poverty.  Several 
studies have been devoted to assessing the targeting performance of a wide range of programs in 
developing and transition economies (e.g., Grosh 1994; Subbarao et al. 1997; Braithwaite et al. 
2000; Coady et al. 2004).  In the case of utilities such as water and electricity, while subsidies are 
very widespread, it is not clear that they are well targeted (Wodon et al., 2003; Komives et al., 
2005; Angel-Urdinola et al., 2006)
1.  This is problematic given that in developing and transition 
economies, utility subsidies are often more costly than other transfer programs (Alderman 2002).   
The objective of this note is to provide a framework to analyze the determinants of the 
targeting performance of social programs and transfers, with an application to electricity 
subsidies in three African countries.  While most indicators of benefit incidence are silent as of 
why subsidies are targeted the way they are (they only give an idea of the targeting performance 
of the subsidies)
2, we develop a simple decomposition that allows analyzing both “access” and 
“subsidy-design” factors that affect the overall targeting performance of subsidies.  Section 2 




In what follows, we use capital letters to denote means across the population as a whole 
or the poor, and lower case letters to define household level variables.  Define by SP and SH the 
amounts of subsidies granted to the poor and to the population as a whole respectively.  While 
we consider electricity subsidies here, the framework can be applied to any other type of subsidy.  
Our benefit targeting performance indicator Ω is defined as the share of the subsidy benefits 
received by the poor (SP/SH) divided by the proportion of the population in poverty (P/H), where 
H denotes all households and P denotes the households who are poor.  A value that is lower 
(greater) than one implies that the average subsidy for the poor is lower (greater) than the 
average subsidy received in the population as a whole.  The parameter Ω can be computed from 
household surveys with data on expenditure or consumption of utility services provided that 
























) ( ,     (1) 
 
where qi is the quantity consumed by household i and  C pi −  is the unit subsidy for household i 
(i.e., the difference between average unit price for the household and unit cost of service C 
assumed constant across households.) 
The parameter Ω can be decomposed in five key factors affecting its value: access, take-
up, targeting, rate of subsidization, and quantity consumed.  The first factor is access to networks 
in the neighborhood where the household lives, denoted by A, with typically access for the poor 
                                                 
1 There are some exceptions to this when subsidies are allocated according to proxy-means testing as in the case of 
Colombia and Chile (e.g., Gomez-Lobo and Contreras, 2003), yet when compared to other targeted subsidies, utility 
subsidies typically are less well targeted than these other subsidies (e.g., Wodon and Yitzhaki, 2002).  On tariff 
design more generally, see among others Whittington (1992) and Boland and Whittington (2000). 
2 For a good discussion of standard benefit incidence analysis, see for example Demery (2003).    2
lower than for the population as a whole (AP<AH). The second factor is take-up or usage of 
service when households have access, with often lower usage among the poor than the 
population as a whole conditional on access (UP|A<UH|A).  The product of A and U is the 
connection rate (share of households using network water or electricity).  The variables A and U 
affect the targeting performance of subsidies since in order to receive a subsidy households must 
first consume the good that is subsidized.  The third factor is subsidy targeting (conditional on 
usage), which takes a value of one for households who receive a subsidy, and zero otherwise. 
When utility consumption is subsidized for all users we have TP|U=TH|U=1.  Beneficiary 
incidence (the probability of receiving or not the subsidy among a specific population group) is: 
 
U H A H H H T U A B | | =       (2.1) 
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To estimate benefit incidence (as opposed to beneficiary incidence), two more factors 
must be taken into account: the rate of subsidization and the quantity consumed among those 
who benefit from the subsidy.  If the average quantity consumed by subsidy recipients in the 
population as a whole is QH|T, and the average expenditure on the good is EH|T, the average rate 
of subsidization is RH|T = 1 - EH|T / (QH|T C).  The average value of the subsidy received among 
subsidy recipients is then RH|T QH|T C.  For the poor, the average subsidy received among those 
who benefit from the subsidy is RP|T Q P|T  C.  Overall, the average subsidy benefits in the 
population as a whole and among the poor are: 
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Thus Ω is the product of five ratios for access, uptake, targeting, rate of subsidization, 
and quantity consumed.  In most cases, the ratio of access rates will be lower than one (the poor 
tend to live in areas with lower access rates than the population as a whole), and the ratio of 
usage or take-up rates for the service will also be lower than one (when access is available in a 
neighborhood or village, the poor are less likely to be connected to the network than the 
population as a whole due to high costs of connection).  Also, the quantities consumed in the 
population as a whole tend to be larger than those consumed by the poor.  This means that the 
design of the subsidy mechanisms (through the values of T and R for the poor and the population 
as a whole) must be pro-poor if overall targeting is to be pro-poor (value of  Ω larger than one). 
To better understand the design of typical subsidy mechanisms for water and electricity, 
denote as before by qi  the quantity consumed by a particular household i and by ei the 
expenditure for that household. Consider first a benchmark case corresponding to an inverted   3
block tariff (IBT) structure with two price levels:  ΠA and ΠB, with ΠA < ΠB.  The reasoning can 
easily be extended to more blocks.  The variable L denotes the consumption threshold (in 
kilowatt-hours or cubic meters per month) at which the unit price for the good shifts from ΠA to 
ΠB.  In IBTs, L is often considered as a “lifeline”, that is a level of consumption needed for a 
household to meet its basic needs.  If we denote by ti a dummy variable taking a value of one for 
a household eligible to benefit from the lifeline rate (and a value of zero otherwise), the 
expenditure of household i is:  
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In (5), all households pay a unit price of ΠA per quantity consumed below the lifeline L, 
and for those who consume more than L, the price per unit consumed above that threshold is ΠB.  
Household wither higher consumption will pay a higher average price per unit consumed, but 
since all households with a positive consumption benefit from the lower unit prices for quantities 
below L, the targeting indicator ti is equal to one, meaning that every household consuming some 
quantity benefits from a lower unit price for at least part of the quantity consumed.   
  An alternative tariff structure is to grant the lower price ΠA only to those households 
consuming less than L.  This is referred to as a Volume Differentiated Tariff (VDT) as follows: 
 







L q if q




i , with  1 = i t  if { 0 > i q  and  L qi ≤ }. (6) 
 
  In (6), if total quantity consumed is above L, the unit price is ΠB, and this price applies to 
the total quantity consumed.  In turn, since only the households who consume less than L benefit 
from the lower price ΠA, the targeting indicator takes a value of one only for those households. 
Equations 5 and 6 enable us to compute subsidy rates for the poor and the population as a 
whole under alternative tariff designs. If we denote the average subsidy rate for the poor RP 
(among poor households who benefit for at least part of their consumption from a lower tariff 
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where pi takes a value of one for a household in poverty and zero otherwise, and 1(pi = 1) and 
1(ti = 1) are indicator functions taking a value of one if the conditions are met (i.e., the 
household is poor in the first function, and the household benefits from a lower tariff rate on at 
least part of its consumption in the second function), and zero otherwise.  Thus only households 
verifying these conditions are included in the estimation of the ratio of expenditures to costs.  
The subsidy rate at the national level RH is calculated likewise among all households who benefit 
from the subsidy: 
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A similar framework can be applied to connection subsidies.  Even if we do not have 
information in the household survey on who benefited from a connection subsidy (for example 
because no such subsidies already exist), we can still assess the potential value for Ω under 
various scenarios. Denote the average subsidy rate for a connection subsidy received by a 
household in the overall population obtaining subsidized connections by R
C
H|T.  This rate 
depends on the difference between the average cost of a connection (C
C), assumed constant for 
all households for simplicity, and the connection fee paid (F
C
H).  The rate of subsidization R
C
H|T 





C.  For the poor R
C




Three stylized scenarios for connections subsidies can be considered.  First, assume that 
connection subsidies will be distributed in the same way as existing connections.  This is a 
pessimistic assumption from a distributional point of view since it tends to favor better off 
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  Second, new connections could be distributed randomly among households who are 
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  Third, new connection subsidies could be randomly distributed among all households 
who do not currently have access (an optimistic assumption given that many of these households 
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We should typically observe that Ω
 C1 < Ω
 C2< Ω
 C3.  
 
3. Empirical  Illustration 
 
The framework is applied to household survey data from Cape Verde, Sao Tome and 
Principe and urban Rwanda, using in each country a nationally representative household survey 
implemented circa 2001 (the exact dates of the surveys are 2001-2002 for Cape Verde, 2000-
2001 for Sao Tome and Principe, and 1999-2001 for Rwanda).  In each of the three countries, for 
comparability purposes, we consider that the bottom 40 percent of the population in terms of 
consumption per capita is poor.  In the case of Rwanda, we restrict the analysis to urban areas 
because access to electricity is virtually inexistent in rural areas.  The tariff structures for water 
and electricity in Cape Verde and Sao Tome are IBTs.  In Cape Verde, households paid 20.5 
CVE (Cape Verde Escudos) per kilowatt-hour (kWh) consumed above the lifeline of 40 kWh 
and 16.5 CVE below that threshold.  In Sao Tome and Principe, households paid 601.31 Dobras   5
per kWh under 100 kWh, 1000.68 Dobras per kWh between 100 kWh and 300 kWh, and 
1519.97 Dobras/kWh above 300 kWh. For simplicity, tariffs in the top blocks of the IBTs for 
Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe are assumed to represent average cost, which is close to 
available estimates for Cape Verde (in Sao Tome, we do not have good data on true costs).  In 
Rwanda, households paid a flat rate of 42 Rwanda Francs per kWh whatever their level of 
consumption, but the cost of providing service was estimated at 81.25 Rwanda francs per kWh.  
In order to facilitate comparisons with Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, we will 
simulate the targeting performance of an IBT structure in Rwanda according to which 
households would pay 42 Rwanda Francs per kWh for their consumption below 40kwh, and 
81.25 Rwandan Francs for their consumption above that level.  This improves a bit the targeting 
performance versus the actual flat rate, but not by very much
3.   
Results for the decomposition of the determinants of subsidy performance are provided in 
Table 1.  Consider for example the case of Cape Verde where Ω takes a value of 0.48.  This 
implies that electricity subsidies are not pro-poor, since the share of the subsidies that goes to the 
poor is almost three times lower than the share of the poor in the population.  Even lower values 
are observed for Sao Tome and Principe (Ω=0.40) and for urban Rwanda (Ω=0.30). 
The low values for Ω are due in large part to access factors.  In the case of Cape Verde 
for example, access is lower for the poor (AP=0.71) than the population as a whole (AH=0.82).
4  
Within areas with access, uptake is also lower for the poor (UP|A=0.29) than for the population as 
a whole (UH|A=0.54).  All households receive the subsidy (since electricity pricing follows an 
IBT structure), hence TP|U=TH|U =1. The rate of subsidization is greater for the poor than for all 
households (RP|T=0.11, versus RH|T=0.06), but the average quantity in kWh per month consumed 
by poor households connected to the network is less than half the quantity consumed in the 
population as a whole (QP|T=49.31, versus QH|T=111.72).   
Similar results are obtained for the other two countries. In Sao Tome access to the 
network is lower for the poor (AP=0.73) than in urban areas as a whole (AH=0.85), and so is 
uptake (UP|A=0.32 versus UH|A=0.50). All households again receive the subsidy (TP|U=TH|U=1)  
but the rate of subsidization is slightly better for the poor (RP|T=0.45, versus RH|T=0.40).  Yet the 
average quantity in kWh consumed by the poor is more than 50 percent higher for the population 
as a whole than for the poor.  Finally in the IBT simulated for urban Rwanda, the value of the 
access and uptake parameters are AP=0.78, AH=0.86, UP|A=0.18 and UH|A=0.37.  In the simulated 
IBT, TP|U=TH|U=1.  As for the rates of subsidization and quantity consumed, the values obtained 
are RP|T=0.24, RH|T=0.19, QP|T=63.01, and QH|T=92.49.  
Could targeting performance be improved under an alternative tariff structure?   
Simulations have been conducted for VDTs under which the pricing for each block is applied to 
the total consumption of the households in that block
5.  In the case of Cape Verde, as shown in 
Table 2, the targeting performance indicator Ω  increases dramatically, from 0.48 to 1.06.  In the 
Sao Tome and Principe, the increase is smaller, from 0.40 to 0.47, while in Rwanda, the increase 
                                                 
3 In urban Rwanda, Ω takes a value of 0.30 under the flat rate, and 0.39 under the simulated IBT, holding household 
consumption constant.  Given that the key messages from the decomposition of the value of  Ω are very similar for 
the flat rate and the IBT, we focus on the IBT results, for comparison purposes with the other two countries. 
4 Households are considered to have access to the network if other households in their neighborhood reported having 
either water or electricity connections.  This might overestimate the share of households with access if a 
neighborhood as defined by the Primary Sampling Unit in the household survey covers a large geographical area.   
5 We assume for simplicity that different tariff structures do not change the total consumption of households (i.e., qi 
remains constant), nor do they change the average cost production, transmission and distribution for the utility.     6
is from 0.39 to 0.63.  Thus, while shifting from an IBT to a VDT might not make electricity 
subsidies pro-poor, this would nevertheless help in improving targeting performance.  As to the 
reason for the higher performance, it is associated with better values for the T and Q ratios (recall 
that quantities consumed are estimated among those who benefit from the subsidy).  As to the R 
ratio, it is equal to one under VDTs since all of those who consume less than the lifeline pay the 
same reduced unit price for the service. 
An alternative to consumption subsidies would be to implement instead connection 
subsidies.  Table 2 provides estimates of Ω  under the three scenarios considered in the 
methodological discussion in Section 2 of this note.  In all three countries, the value of Ω 
c1 and  
Ω
 c2 are similar, ranging from 1.16 to 1.35.  This suggests that well designed connection 
subsidies could show good potential targeting performance.  However, if new connections were 
distributed in a similar way to existing connections, targeting performance would remain poor, as 
suggested by values for Ω
  c3 in the 0.44-0.56 range.     
 
4.   Conclusion 
 
    Several clear messages emerge from the decomposition presented in this paper and its 
application to electricity subsidies in three African countries.  First, access factors are important 
in determining the potential beneficiaries of consumption and connection subsidies.  As poor 
households tend to live in areas without electricity service, or far from electric lines where 
service exists, it is difficult for them to benefit from electricity subsidies simply because they are 
not connected to the network.  In order to compensate for the negative impact of access factors 
on targeting performance, good subsidy design mechanisms are required.  Yet the IBT tariff 
structures that prevail in many countries tend to be poorly targeted.  One alternative to traditional 
IBTs would be to shift to VDT tariff structures.  Another alternative would be to provide 
connection as opposed to consumption subsidies.  The simulations implemented in this paper 
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Table 1: Determinants of consumption subsidy performance in Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Rwanda 





































Ω  (A) (U|A)  (T|U) (R|T  ) (Q|T)  Ω  (T|U)  ( R|T )  (Q|T) 
Cape Verde Electricity                   
Poor  households    0.72  0.34  1.00  0.11 56.83    0.47  0.20 20.33 
All households    0.82  0.54  1.00  0.06  111.72    0.24  0.20  21.15 
Ratio  0.48  0.88  0.63  1.00 1.70 0.51  1.06  1.99 1.00 0.96 
Sao Tome Electricity                   
Poor  households    0.73  0.32  1.00  0.53 84.65      0.97  0.45 76.95 
All households    0.85  0.50  1.00  0.46  138.20     0.91  0.40  109.67 
Ratio  0.40  0.86  0.65  1.00 1.16 0.61  0.47  1.07 1.11 0.70 
Rwanda Electricity                   
Poor  households    0.78  0.18  1.00  0.24 63.01    0.45  0.48 21.99 
All  households    0.86  0.37  1.00  0.19 92.49    0.28  0.48 25.11 
Ratio  0.39  0.91  0.49  1.00 1.31 0.68  0.63  1.62 1.00 0.88 
Source: Authors’ estimation.   9
Table 2: Simulated connection subsidy performance in Cape Verde, Sao Tome and 





taken randomly from 




Subsidy recipients taken 
randomly from household 
with access in their area 
but no yet connected 
Ω
 C1  
Subsidy recipients similar 
in characteristics to 
households already 
connected to the network 
Cape Verde Electricity  1.35 1.25  0.55 
Sao Tome Electricity  1.32 1.16  0.56 
Urban Rwanda Electricity  1.27 1.18  0.44 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 